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Abstract
This paper compares the CSR profiles of companies operating under the
same macroeconomic institutions but with different levels of union density.
Drawing from stakeholder and neo-institutional theories that distinguish be-
tween internal and external actions, this paper finds that companies initially
have to substitute internal for external CSR. After some experience dealing
with unions, companies can complement both actions. There is perhaps a
reinforcement of mutual trust and loyalty, which has implications for man-
agerial prerogatives.
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1 Introduction
The spread of voluntary corporate initiatives in the environmental, social, and
governance domains - commonly referred to as “corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR)” - can be attributed to increased institutional and social pressures for
ethical, responsible, and sustainable business practices (Carroll (1979); Aupperle
(1991); Campbell (2007); Waddock (2008)). Firms can respond to such pressures
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by taking actions that are visible to its external stakeholders (e.g investors, con-
sumers) via better disclosure practices, branding, low involvement with ‘sinful’
industries, and improved product quality control. They can also take internal ac-
tions that are most salient to internal stakeholders (e.g. employees). Such actions
can be in the form of setting up conditions and work environments that foster
health and safety. The scope of CSR activities that a company may undertake
can, therefore, affect multiple stakeholders both inside and outside the firm, and
it has been shown that a wider gap between internal and external actions, one
reflecting more “talk” and less “action” by firms, negatively affects financial per-
formance (Hawn and Iaonnou (2016)). The latter in addition to other studies done
over the last decade point to the multitude benefits of engaging in CSR. Indeed,
a meta-analysis by Margolis et al. (2007) suggests a significant positive link be-
tween CSR and firm financial performance. While a big section of the literature
on CSR has been populated with studies that have related social performance to
financial performance, there still remains a relative paucity of papers with regards
to the interaction between stakeholder demand and corporate supply of CSR. In
other words, the link between the various types of CSR that a firm can enact and
the particular stakeholder motivation or pressure (or simply the desire to improve
corporate image) that leads to such CSR has not been well established. The gaps
are both theoretical and empirical.
Consider, specifically, the case of employees as a stakeholder group. Do they
have enough power internally - or can they draw sufficient attention to the com-
pany - such that their employment rights are upheld in the most suitable manner?
Can they, as a stakeholder, pressure the company to mend and improve its health
and safety procedures? Can they force the company to indulge in practices that
are also beneficial to society and to the environment? From the corporate point
of view, do firms view CSR as a vehicle for better employment relations, better
hiring and retention, better reputation building? Such interaction of stakeholder
demand and corporate supply is missing in the CSR field, largely because CSR is
still a burgeoning field and the spread of and benefits to CSR have only recently
become apparent.
This study delves into this important issue by examining whether stakeholder
demand and stakeholder pressure influences the CSR profile of a company. It is
done in a CSR setting for a number of reasons. First, CSR incorporates many of
the attributes that stakeholders desire and lobby for. Such attributes may be in-
ternal to the company but may also be external, suggesting a positive externality
accruing to other related or non-related stakeholder groups. Second, we know that
CSR profiles vary by country, by industry, but also by company. Most of the work
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in comparative CSR has tended to look at the effect or influence of country-level
institutions on CSR differences across countries, with little emphasis on individual
corporate constraints (e.g. Iaonnou and Serafeim (2012); Bluhm and Trappmann
(2012); Williams and Aguilera (2008)). Some emerging literature have incorpo-
rated individual company variables, but the latter mostly revolve around financial
resources (e.g. Gomez and Verma (2012); Hawn and Iaonnou (2016)). The stake-
holder power/pressure aspect has not been explored in the literature, especially
from an empirical perspective. Third, despite the best efforts of the company and
its stakeholders to monitor and deliver best practices, accidents and controversies
happen. In such cases, it would be important to know how the interplay and prior
relationship between stakeholders and the company are able to help manage the
situation and work out solutions to avoid such problems.
The main theoretical focus of this paper is the interplay of stakeholder pres-
sure and corporate delivery of CSR. Stakeholder theory (e.g. Freeman (1984))
and neo-institutional theory (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell (1991)) are the main driv-
ing factors that guide this discussion. I take the view that companies want to
meet the demands of their relevant stakeholders (consumers, suppliers, investors,
employees). Further, drawing from neo-institutional theory, I posit that higher
stakeholder power increases the company’s self regulation and leads to the firm
institutionalizing best practices within the firm (internal CSR) and outside (exter-
nal CSR). In particular, this paper looks at the role of trade unions in the British
context. The British context of employment relations (in the private sector) prob-
ably offers the best setting to study this question because unions have not been
eroded via anti-union legislation such as in the United States, and unions are not
institutionalized such as in continental European countries. Instead, unions can
(freely) organize bargaining units within individual firms (Metcalf (2003); Hy-
man (2010)), and this allows for a comparison between heavily-unionized firms
and lesser-unionized firms to be able to characterize this interplay between stake-
holder (union) pressure and idiosyncratic corporate delivery of CSR.
To test the theoretical predictions, I use an originally-crafted dataset on CSR
from SustainAlytics. Financial data are added from DataStream to create a lon-
gitudinal sample of firms listed on the FTSE100 index, one of the main market
indices in the United Kingdom. Using fixed-effects estimation techniques, this
paper finds that in a similar institutional context, higher union density is asso-
ciated with more internal CSR. Firms listed on the FTSE100 that have a higher
union density create more policies and programs that are geared towards improv-
ing employee relations, even though this relationship is statistically weak. On
the other hand, external CSR performance and union density are related in a U-
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shaped manner, implying that as union density picks up, companies initially have
to “sacrifice” external CSR in order to meet the demands of unions. However,
after a certain threshold of unionization, firms are able to invest in policies and
programs that are more directly related to external stakeholders as well as meet
the demands of employees and unions. As such, overall, this paper finds that the
difference between internal and external CSR is positively related to union den-
sity but at a diminishing rate. At low levels of unionization, companies have to
substitute internal for external CSR, but as unions become more entrenched and
management becomes experienced in terms of dealing with unions, the company
is able to simultaneously do both internal and external CSR. This is analogous to
the economies of scale hypothesis although in this context it is in a much more
positive tone given that more unions actually relates to better (external) social
performance.
This paper makes at least three contributions to the literature on CSR, and the
impact of stakeholders on CSR profiles. First, from a theoretical point of view,
although there have been many papers that have looked at institutional differences
among countries leading to different CSR practices, there have been very few that
have taken an inside look at the corporation, in particular with regards to its key
internal and external stakeholders. The industrial relations literature and other
literatures are ripe in terms of the influence of unions on R&D (Hirsch (1992)),
innovation (Bradley et al. (2015)), and profitability and share value (Ruback and
Zimmerman (1984); Abowd (1989); Lee and Mas (2012)). This paper, to the
author’s knowledge, is the first to look at the influence of unions on corporate
social performance. Second, this paper adds a layer of complexity not studied
before in the comparative CSR literature. While most papers that deal with com-
parative CSR ignore within-country idiosyncratic company differences, this paper
proposes that these differences are important and play a significant role in explain-
ing individual company responses to CSR at the lowest micro level of analysis.
As such, future papers in the comparative CSR sphere could or should exploit
these differences as well. Third, from an empirical perspective, this paper adds
to a debate that has emerged in the literature about the substitutability or com-
plementarity between internal and external CSR. On the one hand, Matten and
Moon (2008) argue that there may be a substitution that is necessary between
implicit elements of CSR (e.g. bounded by rules and regulations such as collec-
tive bargaining) and explicit elements (such as social community involvement and
support). On the other hand, Gjolberg (2009) argue that they are complements.
The findings of this paper, much more robust and much closer to the corporate
stakeholder approach and not limited to using national proxies for collective bar-
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gaining strength, suggest that both are at play. At low levels of power exercised
by internal stakeholders, substitution takes place, whereas at higher levels, there
is complementarity. A finding which has interesting implications for management
and perhaps union renewal debates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical
lenses through which union influence on CSR will be analyzed and develops some
testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology that will be
used to test the hypotheses. Section 4 details the results of the paper while Section
5 leads the discussions and concludes.
2 Stakeholder influence on corporate decisions
CSR proponents offer a somewhat more enlightened view of how firms achieve
competitive advantage as opposed to neo-classical economists. The latter con-
sider CSR to be an agency loss; managers pursue CSR for personal gain, not
shareholder benefit (Friedman (1970)). This notion of agency loss is based on the
definition of CSR in (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, p.117): “we define CSR as
actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm
and that which is required by law”. Under this narrow definition of CSR, it is
not surprising to come across notions of agency problems when discussing CSR.
Proponents of CSR, however, argue that acting in a pro-social manner is actually
in the firms’ best interests. Stakeholder theory (Freeman (1984)), the cornerstone
of the business case for CSR, highlights the importance of a firm’s relationships
with a broader set of individuals and organizations, beyond just shareholders.
Instrumental stakeholder theory (Jones (1995) further clarifies how CSR con-
tributes to the bottom line via its favourable influence on the firm’s relationships
with important stakeholders. The importance of stakeholders can be determined
by their relative power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell et al. (1997)). The
overall logic is that CSR (e.g., generous giving to the community) increases the
trustworthiness of a firm and strengthens relationships with important stakehold-
ers (e.g., increases employee satisfaction), which decreases transaction costs and,
therefore, leads to financial gain (e.g., decreased employee turnover and more
eager talent pool). Such evidence is presented in earlier research such as Dutton
et al. (1994); Brekke and Nyborg (2004). Neo-institutional theory posits, amongst
other things, that firms strategically undertake two types of actions to meet insti-
tutional pressures and gain legitimacy. One type of action is internally focused
such as through structural mimicry adopting best practices seen elsewhere, and
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another type is externally focused which seeks to gain legitimacy from external
constituents (Sine et al. (2007); McDonnell and King (2013)). This distinction
between internally- and externally-focused actions is analogous to the distinction
between internal and external stakeholders which results mainly from stakeholder
theory.
2.1 Unions as a stakeholder
One of the most powerful and legitimate stakeholders of a company is its labor
unions (assuming there is at least one). How does one analyze the relationship
between unions and CSR? A convenient place to start is to consider how Euro-
pean unions view CSR. In Europe, the industrial relations system is such that
unions are heavily institutionalized (and protected) within the system. Research
by Preuss et al. (2006) suggests five possible union responses to CSR, with most
of the unions citing CSR as a threat since it transfers more power and discretion to
managers. One of five possibilities that is discussed is that CSR is only a method
to improving corporate image (to external stakeholders) while diverting attention
from other less popular actions (typically towards internal stakeholders such as
employees). This may indeed be true in both the U.S. case as well as the British
case, where in the private sector unions are typically weaker than their European
counterparts. At the same time, European unions do emphasize that there are some
aspects of CSR that they find appealing. For example, (AKAVA, 2001, p. 1), a
Finnish union for academic professionals suggests that: “CSR has many aspects,
like welfare of personnel, ability to cope and safety at work, promoting equality
and diversity, preventing discrimination, promoting lifelong learning, and man-
agement of change due to restructuring and ageing employees. These all have a
direct impact in staff motivation and productivity”.
Overall, Preuss et al. (2006) finds that unsurprisingly unions emphasize the
internal actions of CSR more than the external actions. Unions, for example, em-
phasize improved work-life balance, better child care facilities, flexible working
arrangements. Another element that unions emphasize is that corporations an-
ticipate industrial change and minimize the negative consequences on personnel
due to restructuring. However, unions are less interested in company-external el-
ements. Few unions in the research by Preuss et al. (2006) mention corporate
community involvement, and even fewer unions are interested in the preservation
of the natural environment. Overall, company-internal aspects of CSR dominate
the CSR agenda of European unions, which are largely institutionalized. This
begs the question: in a country like the UK, where unions have not been sti-
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fled through anti-union legislation, and where unions are not institutionalized but
rather free to organize within individual companies, how does the CSR profile
of companies look like or differ contingent on their degree of unionization? Do
heavily-unionized firms tilt more towards internal aspects of CSR, as opposed to
external aspects? This certainly seems to be plausible given the European findings
from the interviews in Preuss et al. (2006).
2.2 Hypotheses
Despite the fact that CSR has been shown to be positively related to firm value
(e.g. Margolis et al. (2007)), CSR remains a costly endeavour (Gomez and Verma
(2012)). Further, Hawn and Iaonnou (2016) suggest that firms do not under-
take both internal and external actions simultaneously. Few firms seek to “walk
the talk”, i.e. internally improve their structures and employment relations sys-
tems, along with appeasing external constituents with community giving and other
socio-environmental programs. Given that unions prefer to focus the CSR of their
parent firm on internal aspects (Preuss et al. (2006)), I expect that in the British
context, where unions are free to organize and bargain, they will press the com-
pany towards higher internal actions relative to external ones. In other words, the
gap between external and internal actions will be lower in firms that are heavily
unionized (i.e. complements) relative to firms that have fewer unions (i.e. sub-
stitutes). This is because unions are very much a stakeholder that have power,
legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell et al. (1997)). I, therefore formulate the follow-
ing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Companies with higher union densities develop more internal
policies and programs of CSR relative to companies with lower rates of union-
ization
Hypothesis 2. Companies with higher union densities develop less external
policies and programs of CSR relative to companies with lower rates of union-
ization
In order to really capture the influence of unions on internal and external CSR, the
direction of influence is not the only consideration. A quadratic functional form
of union density may also be considered to get a better picture of how unions are
affecting the CSR profile of their parent company. Given the stakeholder typology
developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) that assigns stakeholders on the basis of power,
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legitimacy, and urgency, I posit that higher union densities put more pressure on
companies to meet union demands in an urgent manner such that the internal CSR
score of companies rises at an increasing rate with union density. At the same
time, with CSR being costly and companies not engaging in both internal and
external CSR at the same rate, unions may hinder the external CSR profile, given
that larger unions have more power and urgency and pose a credible threat to
the operations of the company, especially in a relationship of labour-management
conflict such as in the UK. I posit the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. Companies with higher union densities develop internal poli-
cies and programs at an increasing rate relative to companies with lower rates
of unionization. The curvilinear relationship between internal performance
and union density is convex
Hypothesis 4. Companies with higher union densities develop external poli-
cies and programs at a diminishing rate relative to companies with lower rates
of unionization. The curvilinear relationship between external performance
and union density is convex
Combining the above hypotheses allows to develop a further hypothesis with re-
gards to the difference between internal and external CSR and degree of unioniza-
tion. Given the curvilinear relationships expected, I would expect that the differ-
ence between internal and external CSR and its relationship to unionization will
be positive and convex. That is, more and rapid expansion of internal policies and
programs at the expense of external actions. The relationship is not expected to be
zero because it has been shown in the literature that companies will always strive
to maintain some level of external CSR due to branding, corporate image, and in-
creasingly the positive effect on market value and Tobin’s Q (Hawn and Iaonnou
(2016)).1
Hypothesis 5. The relationship between unionization and the difference be-
tween the internal and external CSR scores is positive and convex implying
greater and more rapid expansion of internal policies and programs at the
expense of external actions
Managers and investors in particular may be interested in the opposite relation:
how does the difference between internal and external CSR affect firm value?
1The focus by Hawn and Iaonnou (2016) is on the difference between internal and external
CSR only; they do not show results for internal and external CSR respectively.
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This was the main question exposited in Hawn and Iaonnou (2016). The main
crux of the argument they make is that companies need to “walk the talk” and
complement external CSR approaches with internal structures and policies that
support those activities. They find that differences between external and internal
CSR lead to lower firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. While the focus of
their paper is different to the stakeholder power, legitimacy, and urgency approach
of this paper, it is still beneficial to estimate this relationship, because it is of
interest to a broader group of stakeholders. Both internal and external actions
would contribute to higher firm value in this light, and for at least two reasons:
a) each set of actions improves firm legitimacy, and b) they reduce information
asymmetry between the firm and the investor community, some of whom (e.g.
pension funds, and other ethical investors) may be interested in the CSR profile
of the company they invest in (Cheng et al. (2014); Hawn et al. (2014)). Just like
Hawn and Iaonnou (2016), I expect to find that larger differences between external
and internal CSR are associated with lower firm value.
Hypothesis 6. Larger differences between internal and external CSR scores
are related to lower firm value
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Sample and data collection
The sample is constructed from a number of databases. The CSR data for this
study were provided directly by SustainAlytics, a global leader in sustainability
reporting and Environment-Social-Governance (ESG) metrics. The primary ob-
jective of SustainAlytics, it should be noted, is to provide reliable and comparable
information to investors who want to integrate ethical and other social issues into
their investment strategy and portfolio. For example, pension funds are often
mandated to include CSR in their due diligence process of portfolio decisions.
Analysts working for SustainAlytics collect raw data from company reports and
other third-party reports (e.g. unions, NGOs, government and Stock Exchange
documents) and standardize them into consistent units so that they can arrive at fi-
nal scores that are comparable across companies. Usually, these scores are at three
levels: 1) Environmental, 2) Social, and 3) Governance, and each firm is scored
and ranked on a monthly basis relative to a comparable peer group. For exam-
ple, oil and gas companies would typically be lower in terms of their environment
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score, as a result of which they cannot be compared to banks and other finan-
cial institutions. Rather, SustainAlytics analysts rank companies on a peer-group
basis, where companies in similar ‘baskets’ of ESG are pooled together. This id-
iosyncracy is not a problem for this paper because I will be using SustainAlytics’
raw scores and industry controls to create my own measures.
ESG data is divided into its three components and each component is then
further subdivided into several subcomponents (see Figure ?? for the categories
employed by SustainAlytics). For the purpose of this study, I will focus only on
the social theme, and its three subcomponents because it is not clear which aspects
of governance and environment apply more to internal or external stakeholders.
The theoretical approach in Hawn and Iaonnou (2016) is mostly neo-institutional
theories and they do consider some aspects such as “percentage of women on
the Board of Directors” as internal CSR. However, given that the main theoret-
ical driver of this paper is stakeholder theory, I cannot do that. Percentage of
women on the Board of Directors may be appealing to internal stakeholders such
as management and labour, but it may also be appealing to investors and poten-
tial investors who may view women as more ethical in their business conduct.
Similarly, programs to reduce water and energy usage is viewed as an aspect of
internal CSR in Hawn and Iaonnou (2016), which may be of interest to employee
morale, but it may be of more interest to environmental stakeholders, the media,
and other external stakeholders including “green” investors. In other words, I take
the view that governance and environment are noisier measures of internal and ex-
ternal CSR, and social is clearer given that SustainAlytics can delineate between
CSR that affects employees (internal stakeholders), and suppliers, clients and the
community (external stakeholders).2 Internal CSR will, therefore, consist of el-
ements of CSR that fall under the category ‘employees’, whereas external CSR
will comprise of CSR elements that pertain mostly to suppliers, clients, and so-
ciety, local communities and philanthropy. To give a couple of examples, under
internal CSR, items such as policies with regards to health and safety, work-life
balance are considered. For external, items such as policy on certifying suppliers,
programs to increase purchase fair-trade materials, community engagement pro-
grams are used. A full set of variables is listed in Table ??. Each item is scored
out of 100, whereby best performance is 100, next best would be 75 or 50, and so
on until the company scores 0 for an item where it fails considerably. In total, the
2The summary statistics will nonetheless include the SustainAlytics measures of total, gover-
nance, social, and environment scores. Results in Appendix Table ?? consider these as dependent
variables, without trying to separate which items in each of these themes may apply to internal or
external stakeholders.
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data contains 14 items that make up the internal score (15 - 1(degree of unioniza-
tion)), and 43 items that make up the external score. Degree of unionization is left
out and is used separately as an explanatory variable.
Financial data are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream database. In
particular, the items used are size (market value), profitability (return on equity),
opportunistic value or potential of the firm (calculated as Tobin’s Q), liquidity
position (calculated as quick ratio). The final sample includes 1190 observations,
an unbalanced panel with 96 unique firms from the FTSE100 during the period
2009-2013 (divided into quarters, with 1 quarter in 2009, and full quarters from
2010 to 2013, i.e. a total of 17 time periods). Note that the independent variables
will be lagged by 1 quarter.
3.2 Dependent variables
Both of the CSR scores (i.e. internal and external) are obtained by totalling the
scores for all of their respective items, and this is done for each company i at time
t. Note that SustainAlytics usually uses a proprietary weighting standard to score
and rank companies contingent on industry (or peer group) belonging. However,
I will not use this approach for this study because I have no method to validate
or invalidate their proprietary weighting standard. Instead each item that forms
the internal CSR score and each item that forms the external CSR score will be
assigned equal weight. This follows the convention in the literature from Waddock
and Graves (1997); Hillman and Keim (2001); Iaonnou and Serafeim (2012) and
others. Nonetheless, the scores may still be heavily tilted in terms of industry
dependence (e.g. certain industries may have more supply chain monitoring issues
in general), and therefore, relative standardized scores are then calculated for each
of internal and external CSR with respect to an industry j benchmark at time t.
RelCSRscoreit =
CSRTotalit −Min(CSRTotal jt)
Max(CSRTotal jt)−Min(CSRTotal jt) (1)
where CSR refers to any one of Internal (INT) or External (EXT) CSR score. This
method also allows to bound the measures between 0 and 1, and make interpreta-
tions more standard, as per Baron (2009).
3.3 Independent variables
With regards to independent variables, union density, as provided by SustainAlyt-
ics is used. Some companies have zero unions and, therefore zero union density.
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Natural logarithmic transformation is applied to market value given the large vari-
ation in the data, while the other variables (Return on Equity, Quick Ratio, and
Tobin’s Q) are kept the same.
3.4 Econometric specification
With the unbalanced panel of 96 firms observed over 17 quarters and to test the
aforementioned hypotheses, I adapt a specification that has been used in the CSR
literature by Baron (2009) and Iaonnou and Serafeim (2014). Equation 2 gives the
specification that will be used in this analysis.
RelCSRscoreit = αi +β0 +β1QuickRatioit−1 +β2 lnMarketValueit−1+
β3ReturnonEquityit−1+β4UnionDensityit−1+β6UnionDensitySquaredit−1+εit
(2)
where RelCSRscoreit can be either Internal or External CSR score of company i at
time t or the difference between the Internal and External CSR scores.3. Equation
2 is estimated using the fixed effects methodology, as a result of which industry
controls are not used. Random effects were used as a check but a Hausmann
test suggested that fixed effects estimation will produce more consistent results
(p-value of test was around 0.03).
4 Results
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. The means,
standard deviations, minimums and maximums are shown both across firms and
within firms. The summary statistics reveal that there is quite a large variation
in the data, whether it be the scores provided by SustainAlytics, or my calculated
internal and external CSR scores. The same observation holds for the independent
variables as well. Overall, most of the variation happens across firms rather than
within firms. However, the variations within are substantial enough to warrant the
use of fixed effect modelling. The results that follow will control for these varia-
tions by clustering standard errors at the firm level. Note that calculating standard
3I also use the scores provided by SustainAlytics (i.e. Total, Environment, Social, Governance)
but these are much more noisy than the measures I am using given it is not clear what components
of Governance for instance matter most to internal rather than external stakeholders. Also, the
weights used by SustainAlytics is proprietary and serves towards purposes of ranking companies:
not an objective of this study
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errors for 96 clusters greatly reduces the degrees of freedom of the models and
reduces the significance of many variables. Separate results (not shown) using
White’s method of controlling for heteroskedasticity show qualitatively similar
results but the levels of significance of some variables are higher.
Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations between the main variables of inter-
est. Significance levels are not shown but one observation about union density and
company measures is that unions tend to organize more in larger firms, as mea-
sured by market value. Also, and this goes in line with Metcalf (2003), unions
overall are associated with under-performing firms, as measured by both the To-
bin’s Q and Return on Assets. However, with regards to CSR, they do seem to be
associated with more socially responsible firms, across all dimensions and mea-
sures used. Interestingly, the correlation between unions and internal CSR is much
higher than the correlation between unions and external CSR.
Table 3 presents the main regression results of estimating the internal CSR
scores with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Model 1 represents a ba-
sic model without the main independent variable of interest: union density. The
results show that firms that have a better liquidity position (higher quick ratio) in
period t − 1 are able to score higher in their internal CSR policies and programs
given that they invest in more internal quality programs and monitoring. Return
on Equity in period t − 1 is negatively correlated with internal CSR in period t.
This is an interesting finding, implying that companies that financially do poorly
in a certain period will increase the quality of their internal policies and programs
in the next period. This is akin to the “damage mitigation” hypothesis posited by
Gomez and Verma (2012). Model 2 adds a linear measure of union density, and
we find that the previous observations remain (albeit return on assets is insignifi-
cant) and that union density in period t−1 is positively related to internal CSR. A
1 standard deviation increase in union density is associated with a 0.02 (obtained
by multiplying the coefficient with the standard deviation of union density in Ta-
ble 1) standard deviation increase in internal CSR. Model 3 also adds the square
term of union density in order to capture non-linear trends of internal policies and
programs as a function of union density. Results show that there is no non-linear
trend. Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, sustained while Hypothesis 3 is rejected given
that the relationship between internal CSR and unionization seems to be only lin-
ear. In specifications that use White’s method of controlling for heteroskedasticity
instead of firm-level clustering of standard errors, the non-linearity is sustained
even though the coefficient on the quadratic term is negative, implying slower rate
of expansion of internal programs and policies as union density rises.
Table 4 presents the main regression results of estimating the external CSR
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TABLE 1: Summary statistics for main variables of interest
Variable Variation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total Score overall 0.519 0.358 0.000 1.000
between 0.331 0.000 1.000
within 0.172 −0.364 1.166
Environment Score overall 0.526 0.349 0.000 1.000
between 0.318 0.000 1.000
within 0.182 −0.359 1.173
Social Score overall 0.506 0.358 0.000 1.000
between 0.334 0.000 1.000
within 0.168 −0.326 1.182
Governance Score overall 0.504 0.359 0.000 1.000
between 0.318 0.000 1.000
within 0.196 −0.341 1.239
Internal Score overall 0.428 0.370 0.000 1.000
between 0.333 0.000 1.000
within 0.192 −0.305 1.250
External Score overall 0.415 0.351 0.000 1.000
between 0.303 0.000 1.000
within 0.186 −0.467 1.194
Quick Ratio overall 0.409 1.399 0.000 21.195
between 1.044 0.000 9.140
within 0.876 −8.638 12.464
Tobin’s Q overall 1.599 0.949 0.547 9.949
between 1.300 0.678 9.949
within 0.261 0.407 3.302
Market value (£billions) overall 12.209 18.653 0.00167 132.745
between 16.868 0.00167 114.729
within 3.416 −11.978 35.154
Return on Equity (%) overall 33.876 266.166 −131.290 7206.450
between 128.221 −131.290 1365.863
within 231.809 −1195.717 5874.463
Union Density overall 0.178 0.265 0.000 1.000
between 0.229 0.000 1.000
within 0.121 −0.347 0.693
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TABLE 3: Fixed effects estimates of Internal CSR score
(1) (2) (3)
Internal CSR Internal CSR Internal CSR
Quick Ratio 0.0144∗∗ 0.0141∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗
(0.00424) (0.00419) (0.00413)
Tobin’s Q −0.0336 −0.0356 −0.0314
(0.0456) (0.0450) (0.0443)
Size (Market Value) −0.0649 −0.0592 −0.0661
(0.0547) (0.0539) (0.0585)
Return on Equity −0.00166∗∗∗ −0.00115∗∗ −0.000928
(0.000303) (0.000410) (0.000653)
Union Density 0.154+ 0.265
(0.0855) (0.262)
Union Density squared −0.141
(0.246)
Constant 1.049∗ 0.975∗ 1.022∗
(0.469) (0.461) (0.488)
Observations 1190 1190 1190
R2 within 0.019 0.026 0.027
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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scores with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Model 1 again represents
a basic model without the main independent variable of interest: union density.
The results show that Return on Equity in period t − 1 is positively correlated
with external CSR in period t, going against the “damage mitigation” hypothesis
posited by Gomez and Verma (2012). Firms work more with suppliers, clients,
and the community when they perform better in the previous period. This result
stands in contrast to the result that is obtained when internal CSR is considered.
Different corporate approaches to CSR seem to be working here. When results
are bad in a certain period, firms invest more in internal CSR and less in exter-
nal CSR in the next period. Perhaps, British firms view CSR as a morale and
productivity-boosting endeavour. The fact that liquidity position and size and op-
portunistic value of the firm are not correlated with external CSR in a significant
manner also adds credence to the idea that (external) CSR is perhaps a market-
ing tool employed to improve performance, rather than reflect past performance
(the insurance hypothesis in Gomez and Verma (2012)). Model 2 adds a linear
measure of union density, and results show that union density in period t −1 has
no significant relationship to external CSR in period t. However, and as Model 3
shows, this is because there is a very high non-linearity in the relationship between
union density and external CSR. The linear effect of unions on external CSR is
negative, implying that there is a substitution effect that takes place. With unions,
companies invest less in external CSR, perhaps because they have to devote more
resources to internal policies and programs, as argued above in the results of in-
ternal CSR. However, this substitution is not binding. The high positive on the
square term suggests that substitution ends after some degree of unionization, and
in fact the trend reverses such that external CSR and internal CSR go hand-in-
hand. In other words, results show that there is both a substitution effect (Matten
and Moon (2008)) and a complement effect (Gjolberg (2009)) between internal
and external CSR. Hypothesis 2 is, therefore, mildly sustained while Hypothesis
4 is rejected given that the relationship between external CSR and unionization is
highly concave.
The relationship between unionization and the difference between internal and
external CSR scores can be looked at in a more coherent way from the results
shown in Table 5, where the dependent variable is ‘internal MINUS external’
scores. The three models follow the same procedure as before, with unionization
entering in phases. Model 2 suggests a positive relationship between unionization
and the difference between internal and external CSR, although the result is statis-
tically insignificant. When union density is entered in as a square term, the results
show that the difference increases with union density but only up to a point, after
17
TABLE 4: Fixed effects estimates of External CSR score
(1) (2) (3)
External CSR External CSR External CSR
Quick Ratio 0.00239 0.00240 0.000470
(0.00392) (0.00393) (0.00348)
Tobin’s Q −0.0103 −0.0102 −0.0259
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0309)
Size (Market Value) −0.0401 −0.0404 −0.0145
(0.0549) (0.0552) (0.0553)
Return on Equity 0.00443∗∗∗ 0.00440∗∗∗ 0.00356∗∗∗
(0.000519) (0.000600) (0.000759)
Union Density −0.00899 −0.426+
(0.0950) (0.233)
Union Density squared 0.530∗
(0.251)
Constant 0.781+ 0.785+ 0.611
(0.445) (0.450) (0.449)
Observations 1190 1190 1190
R2 within 0.010 0.010 0.025
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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which the reverse happens. A 1 standard deviation increase in union density is
correlated with a gap of 0.0785 between internal and external CSR. External CSR
picks up more pace so that the difference reduces and even flips in favour of ex-
ternal CSR , given the size of the linear and square-term coefficients. Hypothesis
5 is correct only to a certain extent, and it is, therefore, rejected.
Post-regression estimates of internal and external CSR scores as a function of
union density are shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, internal CSR scores rise
with union density but at a diminishing rate. Statistically, given the conservative
methods used for estimating standard errors, the observed effects are not signifi-
cant. With regards to external CSR scores shown on the right panel, we note that
external CSR initially falls as union density starts to pick up, but after about 40%
union density, the trend is reverse. External CSR picks up rather significantly.
With regards to the difference between internal and external CSR, there is quite
much to observe from Figure 2. First, the post-regression estimates, holding all
else at their means, show that below 10% unionization, companies invest more in
external rather than internal policies and programs. Between 12% to 90% union-
ization, the trend changes and companies score higher on internal CSR rather than
external CSR.
More importantly, a further observation is that there are both substitution and
complement effects between internal and external CSR. Companies substitute in-
ternal for external CSR up to union density levels of approximately 50%. The
upward trend means that the difference between internal and external CSR keeps
growing as a function of union density, albeit at a diminishing rate. After 50%
unionization, internal and external CSR work in tandem. They complement each
other, and from Figure 1, we can attribute this to a sharp improvement in external
policies and programs. As such, the difference between the two measures falls,
and quite dramatically too given that external CSR goes beyond internal CSR after
about 90% unionization.
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TABLE 5: Fixed effects estimates of the difference between Internal and External
CSR scores
(1) (2) (3)
Internal MINUS Internal MINUS Internal MINUS
External CSR External CSR External CSR
Quick Ratio 0.0120∗ 0.0117∗ 0.0142∗∗
(0.00555) (0.00561) (0.00515)
Tobin’s Q −0.0233 −0.0254 −0.00551
(0.0568) (0.0563) (0.0544)
Size (Market Value) −0.0248 −0.0188 −0.0516
(0.0661) (0.0670) (0.0689)
Return on Equity −0.00610∗∗∗ −0.00555∗∗∗ −0.00449∗∗∗
(0.000613) (0.000719) (0.000949)
Union Density 0.163 0.691∗
(0.118) (0.306)
Union Density squared −0.670∗
(0.304)
Constant 0.269 0.190 0.411
(0.556) (0.561) (0.564)
Observations 1190 1190 1190
R2 within 0.009 0.014 0.028
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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FIGURE 1: Estimated Internal and External CSR scores, by union density
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FIGURE 2: Estimated difference between Internal and External CSR scores, by
union density
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Finally, I also estimate the effect of the difference between internal and exter-
nal CSR on firm value, as measured by its Tobin’s Q. I use a similar approach to
Hawn and Iaonnou (2016), and carry out this analysis in order to show whether
huge differences between internal and external CSR are detrimental to the firm,
i.e. a firm that does not “walk the talk”. The results from Table 6 show that this is
not the case, even if I do not control for union density.
TABLE 6: Fixed effects estimates of the difference between Internal and External
CSR scores on Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q
Quick Ratio −0.0655∗∗∗
(0.00651)
Size (Market Value) 0.443∗∗∗
(0.121)
Internal MINUS External CSR −0.0337
(0.0603)
Return on Equity 0.00140+
(0.000771)
Union density 0.0520
(0.125)
Constant −2.049+
(1.036)
Observations 1190
R2 within 0.180
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
4.1 Robustness checks
One of the interpretative concerns of the above results is that union density within
firms can change because of two factors, given that union density is measured as
the ratio between unionized employees and total number of employees. If we con-
sider specifically the case where union density is rising within firms, there could
be two broad reasons for this. First, unions may be getting better at organizing
22
within firms over time. Second, firms may be shrinking in size and total employ-
ment, where presumably non-union employees are being laid off rather than union
employees, who are generally better protected (Freeman and Medoff (1984)). As
such, union density rising may not necessarily mean that unions are getting better
at organizing and at (directly) influencing internal CSR, and the difference be-
tween internal and external CSR. It may be the case that the company is shrinking
in size, as a result of which union density is going up. To consider this aspect, I
estimate equation 2 and add the difference in firm size between times t and t −1
as an independent variable. Size is here measured by total assets, rather than mar-
ket value, since it is more correlated with total number of employees at the firm
level.4 This will help control for firm size variations over time. If results are con-
sistent with the earlier reported main estimations, then the interpretation can be
that union density is more closely measuring unions’ ability to organize and in-
fluence the CSR profile of companies. Table 7 reports the results when difference
in size is considered. Models 1 and 2 report results for internal CSR, with union
density entering as a linear term only in Model 1 and as a quadratic term in Model
2. The same exposition is done for external CSR (Models 3 and 4), and difference
between internal and external CSR (Models 5 and 6).
4Note that I do not have total number of employees in my dataset, which is why I am using the
size proxy.
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A comparison between the estimates in Table 7 and the earlier estimates in
Tables 3, 4, and 5 show that the earlier results are robust to the inclusion of size
difference within firms. While size difference is significant in several specifica-
tions, the union density measures have not changed much, both in terms of eco-
nomic as well as statistical significance. Union influence on internal and external
CSR seems to be occurring because unions are better at organizing and/or better
at driving corporate policy.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In order to gain a better understanding of the stakeholder approach to CSR, it is
critical to investigate CSR as a good. On the one hand, who demands CSR, and on
the other hand, how much CSR can be supplied by a company? This paper uses the
stakeholder approach (Freeman (1984)) and a neo-institutional approach distin-
guishing between internal and external actions (Jones (1995)) to investigate how
unions wielding their power, urgency, and legitimacy as stakeholders (Mitchell
et al. (1997)) can affect the CSR profile of companies their members work for.
In this endeavour, this paper has attempted to bridge a gap between two streams
in the CSR literature. As Bluhm and Trappmann (2012) point out, Matten and
Moon (2008) propose that there is a substitution effect between “implicit” CSR
and “explicit” CSR, whereby some firms generally devote more attention to fol-
lowing rules and regulations and maintain their image as such, while other firms
are more explicit in their CSR practices, often with outlandish community and
other social programs. Similarly, Gomez and Verma (2012) and Hawn and Iaon-
nou (2016) point that CSR is costly and companies do not actually do both in-
ternal and external CSR concurrently and at the same rate. The flip side comes
from Bluhm and Trappmann (2012) and Gjolberg (2009) who argue that in certain
countries, internal and external CSR are actually complements, and both serve
to reinforce each other. The findings of this paper, which uses more detailed
data and analyzes companies rather than country-wide averages mostly used in
cross-country comparisons of CSR, show that both elements of substitution and
complementarity are at work. A result that was mostly unexpected. At very low
levels of unionization, companies do more external than internal CSR, catering
to the needs of outside stakeholders more than internal stakeholders. Then, af-
ter approximately 10% unionization rate, companies start substituting internal for
external policies and programs and this substitution goes on, albeit at a diminish-
ing rate. However, unlike my initial prediction that this substitution goes on until
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unionization reaches 100%, the trend actually reverses after unionization reaches
approximately 50%. External CSR gathers pace and work more as a complement
to internal CSR such that the difference between the two narrows. More surpris-
ingly, after 90% unionization, external CSR is higher than internal CSR.
How can we explain these pointedly unexpected but interesting results? The
literature on strategic management and CSR may not be very helpful in this en-
deavour. However, the literature from labour relations may help explain why we
see the aforementioned results. First, Metcalf (2003) points out that unions in
the UK and USA have been shown to reduce investment in physical capital but
increase investment in human capital. This aspect of increasing investment in hu-
man capital may extend to the CSR sphere but not necessarily in a narrow sense.
It is possible that part of collective agreements and union pressure incentivizes
or forces companies to invest in human capital inside but also outside the firm,
through educational grants, health care grants, and other donations to the com-
munity (external stakeholders). This could be an explanation that could help un-
derstand why external CSR goes up after approximately 40 % unionization rate.
Unions could achieve this through negotiations but also through their role of mon-
itoring work. For example, Pencavel (1977) emphasizes the role that unions may
play in overseeing work performance given that they are in a position of high
power and have been allowed to disseminate work payments to workers. A trust-
based relationship between management and labour could be at the core of why we
see high external CSR when union density goes up. At low levels of unionization,
management may have to deal with the shock factor of having to deal with a few
unions while maintaining fairness across the board. Metcalf (2003) terms this the
shock effect of unionization, where management may have to initially “sacrifice”
external CSR to deal with smaller levels of unionization. More importantly, Free-
man and Medoff (1984) proposes that managerial responses to unionism take the
form of more rational personnel policies such as lean production techniques and
more careful monitoring of work, which reduces organizational slack. As such,
it is possible that more rational personnel policies are leaving resources on the
table, which the company is shielding from unions and giving to external stake-
holders in the guise of external policies and programs. These would explain why
we initially see a substitution effect between internal and external CSR and how
the gap eventually narrows down such that both are complements given the trust
and streamlining (productivity gains) that may take place.
One of the most surprising results is that at the highest levels of unionization
(90% and above), the complementarity between internal and external CSR contin-
ues to the extent where external CSR is higher than internal CSR. I can attribute
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this finding to the following. First, as Metcalf (2003) suggests, union presence
sometimes results in adversarial style of industrial relations, lowering trust and
cooperation. This is certainly true for the UK (Hyman (2010)). At very high lev-
els of unionization, the power struggle between union and management could be
severe enough such that management focuses more towards earning warm glow
from external stakeholders by investing massively in external CSR while unions
battle management for legitimacy. This point was made by Freeman and Medoff
(1984), whose argument is that for productivity to rise at the company level, there
must be good industrial relations, where the profits can be increased. If industrial
relations are poor, then common goals between labour and management will be ig-
nored where each actor may set goals that go against the interests of the company.
Further, the relationship between union and management may get even worse if
there are multiple unions within the organization. This last point by Freeman and
Medoff (1984) bears some resemblance to the CSR sphere here. At 90% or higher
levels of unionization, it is highly likely that management is dealing with multiple
unions. The relationship and political fights between management and unions, and
between unions themselves may get so costly that management and unions lose
trust in each other and each prefer to follow their individual rather than collective
goals. This could explain why after 90% unionization, external CSR goes above
internal CSR: management is interested in embracing more external stakeholders
to build support against unions, which it does not trust and which it finds very
difficult to work with. Political explanations are possible.
From a managerial perspective, the results show that large difference between
internal and external CSR may be detrimental to firm value. This goes in line with
Hawn and Iaonnou (2016) and further adds credence to neo-institutional theorists’
view that both internal and external actions need to corroborate for results to be
effective.
In conclusion, this paper has demonstrated that unions using their power, ur-
gency and legitimacy can influence a company’s CSR profile. Companies initially
have to substitute internal for external CSR, but after some experience with deal-
ing with unions, they can do both together. There is perhaps a reinforcement of
mutual trust and loyalty. Both are important from a policy perspective but also
from a managerial and shareholder perspective, because both likely are associated
with higher firm value.
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